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Two-player Stackelberg games are non-zero sum strategic games between a leader (Player 0)
and a follower (Player 1). Such games are played sequentially: first, the leader announces her
strategy, second, the follower chooses his strategy, and then both players receive their respective
payoff which is a function of the two strategies. The function that maps strategies to pairs of
payoffs is known by the two players. As a consequence, if we assume that the follower is fully
rational then we can deduce that the follower responds by playing a so-called best-response to the
strategy of the leader in order to maximise his own payoff. In turn, the leader should choose a
strategy that maximizes the value that she receives when the follower chooses a best-response to
her strategy. If we cannot impose which best-response is chosen by the follower, we say that the
setting is adversarial. But sometimes, a more realistic assumption is to consider that the follower
has only bounded rationality: the follower responds with one of his ǫ-best-responses, for some fixed
ǫ > 0.
In this paper, we study the ǫ-optimal Adversarial Stackelberg Value, ASVǫ for short, which is
the value that the leader can obtain against any ǫ-best-response of a rationally bounded adversarial
follower. The ASVǫ of Player 0 is the supremum of the values that Player 0 can obtain by
announcing her strategy to Player 1 who in turn responds with an ǫ-optimal strategy. We consider
the setting of infinite duration games played on graphs with mean-payoff objectives.
Our results are as follows. First, we show that Player 0 may need an infinite memory strategy
to achieve the ASVǫ. Second, we show that the threshold problem, i.e. given a rational c, deciding
whether ASVǫ > c, is in NP, and a finite memory strategy of Player 0 suffices to achieve this
threshold c. Third, we study the effect on ASVǫ when Player 0 is restricted to only finite memory
strategies. We also improve upon some of the results related to the memory required by strategies
of Player 0 obtained earlier in the framework of two-player Adversarial Stackelberg mean-payoff
games where the ǫ is not fixed. Fourth, we provide an EXPTime algorithm to compute the ASVǫ.
Finally, we prove that the ASVǫ is always achievable, possibly with an infinite memory strategy.
This is in contrast with the framework of two-player Adversarial Stackelberg mean-payoff games
where the ǫ is not fixed.
1 Introduction
Stackelberg games [21] feature strategic interactions among rational agents in markets that comprise
of a leader and followers. The leader starts the game by announcing her strategy and the followers
respond by playing an optimal response to the leader’s strategy.
Our work belongs to the framework of synthesis of reactive programs [19, 1]. These programs
maintain a continuous interaction with the environment in which they operate; they are determin-
istic functions that given a history of interactions choose an action. We consider the framework
of rational synthesis [10] of reactive programs where both the program and the environment have
their own goals, and are thus rational, leading to a continuous non-zero sum interaction between
the program and its environment. The work of [10] guides some of our design choices related to
the study of infinite duration games on graphs for the synthesis problem [6, 19]. However, Boolean
ω-regular payoff functions have been studied in [10] as opposed to the quantitative long-run average
(mean-payoff) function that we study here. Mean-payoff function is not ω-regular, and the regular
tree automata techniques used in [10] cannot be adapted to our setting.
To illustrate our formal setting, we start with an example of a game graph shown in Figure 1
with mean-payoff objectives for both players. This example allows us to introduce the basic notions.
The set V of vertices is partitioned into V0 (represented by circles) and V1 (represented by squares)
that are owned by the leader (also called Player 0) and the follower (also called Player 1) respectively.
The edges for which the weights are not written correspond to 0 payoff for both players. In the
tuple on the edges, the first one is the payoff of the leader, while the second one is the payoff of the
follower. The game starts in vertex v0 and we put a token in this state. The game is then played
for an infinite number of rounds as follows: the owner of the vertex in which the token lies chooses
an edge starting from that vertex to move the token to an adjacent vertex. A new round is then
started from the vertex that the token reaches. The infinite number of rounds of the game define
an infinite path in the graph. The two players receive as payoffs the limit inferior of the average
payoff along the prefixes for their respective dimension. Each player’s objective is to maximize the
payoff that she receives. For i ∈ {0, 1}, Player i plays strategies that are functions σi : V
∗ ·Vi → V ,
and there are uncountably many strategies. In the illustrations of the introduction, for simplicity,
we only use memoryless strategies, that are functions σi : Vi → V , but in general to play optimally
players may need complex strategies that use infinite memory. This will be illustrated later in the
paper, and this makes all our problems challenging.
A Stackelberg profile is one where the follower cannot improve his payoff by unilateral deviation.
The example in Figure 1 illustrates the fact that a Stackelberg profile may produce a better payoff
for the leader than all Nash equilibria (NE). We consider only pure strategies for each player.
Consider the strategy σNashL of the leader in which she always plays v1 → v1, v2 → v3 and v3 → v3.
Let σNashF be a strategy of the follower in which he plays v0 → v1. The strategy profile (σ
Nash
L , σ
Nash
F )
is a Nash Equilibrium since none of the players can unilaterally deviate and improve their individual
payoff, and this profile yields a payoff of 0 for the leader. However, if the leader announces a strategy
σStackelbergL where she plays v1 → v1, v2 → v2 and v3 → v3, the follower will get a better payoff if he
responds with a strategy σStackelbergF where he plays v0 → v2. Thus, the strategy profile (σ
Stackelberg
L ,
σStackelbergF ) is a Stackelberg profile, and it yields a payoff of 1 for the leader. Note that this profile
is not a Nash equilibrium since the leader can improve her payoff by switching to a strategy where
she plays (v2, v3) thus increasing her payoff to 2. In the resultant profile, the follower receives a
payoff of 0, and can increase her payoff to 1 by playing v0 → v1 which thus results into the profile
(σNashL , σ
Nash
F ) which is an NE.
Thus, we can see that the leader with the power to communicate her strategy can influence the
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v0v2 v1
start
v3
(1,2) (0,1)(2,0)
Figure 1: An example in which a Stackelberg
profile gives a better payoff to Player 0 than
every Nash equilibrium
v0v2 v1
start
v3
(1,1) (0,1)(2,0)
Figure 2: An example illustrating co-operative
and adversarial followers in Stackelberg mean-
payoff games
follower to play a strategy which she desires and thereby get a better payoff for herself. Both the
leader and the follower aim at maximising their respective payoffs. However, the follower can have
multiple optimal responses to the leader’s strategy. Two different scenarios can be considered in
this setting: either the optimal-response strategy is imposed by the leader (or equivalently chosen
co-operatively by the two players), or the optimal-response strategy is chosen adversarially by the
follower. We demonstrate the two scenarios with an example depicted in Figure 2. Here, the leader
can announce her strategy σL where she plays v2 → v2. However, in this example the follower has
two optimal responses, i.e. he can play v0 → v1 or v0 → v2. If the follower is co-operative, then he
will choose the strategy which also maximises the leader’s payoff. In this example, the co-operative
follower will choose to play the strategy v0 → v2. Thus, in the co-operative setting, the leader
receives a payoff of 1 and the follower receives a payoff of 1. On the other hand, if the follower is
adversarial, he will choose the strategy which minimises the payoff of the leader. In this example,
the adversarial follower will choose to play v0 → v1. Thus, in the adversarial setting, the leader
receives a payoff of 0 and the follower receives a payoff of 1.
The adversarial case is more robust: it allows us to model the situation in which the leader can
choose her strategy and must be prepared to face any rational response of the follower, i.e. if the
follower has several possible optimal responses then the leader’s strategy should be designed to face
all of them. This adversarial scenario has been recently introduced in [16] to model the synthesis
of reactive systems in rational environments.
As illustrated above, due to the sequential nature of Stackelberg games, Player 1 knows the
strategy that Player 0 will play before the game starts. Therefore, if Player 1 is rational, then he
must choose a strategy that maximises his payoff in response to Player 0’s strategy. Such a strategy
is called a best-response to Player 0’s strategy σ0. In this work, we assume that Player 1 has only
bounded rationality: Player 1 may not always choose a best-response to Player 0’s strategy σ0, we
only assume that, for a given fixed ǫ > 0, he plays a strategy that gives him a payoff that is up to ǫ
less than the best payoff that he can achieve against the leader strategy. Considering ǫ-best-response
may be more reasonable in practice as best-responses may be difficult to compute for the follower
or difficult to execute for example. In this setting, Player 0 should announce a strategy σ0 such
that the payoff she receives is the supremum over all adversarial ǫ-best-responses of Player 1. We
call the payoff obtained by the leader when she plays such a strategy as the ǫ-optimal Adversarial
Stackelberg Value, or simply, the ASVǫ. We demonstrate the difference between an adversarial
fully rational follower and an adversarial bounded rational follower with the example depicted in
Figure 3. The leader has two possible choices from v0; she would either play v0 → v1 or play
v0 → v4. If the follower is fully rational, he would play v1 → v3 and v4 → v6 which correspond
to his best-responses to the two strategies of the leader. The leader in this case chooses v0 → v1
to maximise her payoff to 6 which is the Adversarial Stackelberg Value (ASV). If the follower is
rationally bounded, the leader should be prepared to receive the lowest payoff among the set of
ǫ-best-responses of the follower for a given ǫ. For ǫ > 1, this can be modelled by follower choosing
v1 → v2 and v4 → v6 as responses to the two strategies of the leader respectively. The leader in this
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v0 v1
v2
v3
v4
v5
v6
start (3,5)
(6,6)
(9,5)
(5,6)
Figure 3: An example illustrating Stackelberg mean-payoff games with an adversarial fully rational
follower and an adversarial rationally bounded follower
case chooses v0 → v4 to maximize her payoff, and thus receives a payoff of 5 which is the ǫ-optimal
Adversarial Stackelberg Value (ASVǫ).
Our contributions The authors in [9] assume that the follower is fully rational, and will always
play an adversarial best-response for a given strategy of leader (when it exists). In this work, we
assume that the follower is bounded rational and will always play an ǫ-optimal adversarial best-
response to the strategy of the leader, for a fixed ǫ > 0. Our results are described below, and are
summarized in Table 1. The results obtained in this work are in blue, while the results obtained
in [9] are in green.
We begin by showing that infinite memory may be required in general for Player 0 to achieve
the ASVǫ (Theorem 3.1). We also consider the memory required by Player 1 to play ǫ-best-
responses to a strategy of Player 0. We show that Player 1 too may require infinite memory to play
an ǫ-best-response (Theorem 3.3).
For a given mean-payoff game, a rational value c and an ǫ > 0, the threshold problem is to
check if ASVǫ > c. Similar to the results obtained in [9], we introduce a notion of witness for
proving that ASVǫ > c (Theorem 4.2). However, we need different proof techniques that are
more complex than the ones used in [9] due to challenges that appear because of considering the
follower to be bounded rational. We show that the threshold problem is in NP, and if ASVǫ > c,
then a finite memory strategy of Player 0 suffices (Theorem 4.5). We also show that the problem
is at least as hard as the value problem in zero-sum mean-payoff games [8] whose precise complexity
is a longstanding open problem [22] (Theorem 4.13). Additionally, we prove that a finite memory
strategy is also sufficient to achieve ASV > c (Theorem 4.11).
We denote by ASVǫFM the ǫ-optimal Adversarial Stackelberg Value obtained by Player 0 when
she is limited to playing only finite memory strategies. We use ASVFM when ǫ is not fixed as has
been studied in [9]. We show that ASVǫFM = ASV
ǫ and ASVFM = ASV (Corollary 4.12).
Next we study the problem of computation of ASVǫ. In [9], it has been established that the
ASV can be expressed as a formula in the theory of reals with addition, and can be computed with
quantifier elimination. However, no precise complexity results have been provided. In this work,
we show that we can adapt the methods used in [9] to express the ASVǫ as a formula in the theory
of reals with addition (Theorem 5.5). Further, this approach gives us the necessary intuition
to formulate the problem of computing ASVǫ using a set of linear programs, where each linear
program has exponential number of constraints, thus giving us a EXPTime algorithm to compute
the ASVǫ (Theorem 5.8).
Finally, we study the problem of achievability of ASVǫ. The ASVǫ is said to be achievable if
there exists a strategy σ0 for Player 0 such that Player 0 by choosing the strategy σ0 receives a
payoff that is at least equal to the ASVǫ. While in [9], it has been shown that ASV is not always
achievable, here, in contrast that ASVǫ is always achievable (Theorem 6.1).
3
Threshold Problem Computing ASV Achievability
Adversarial
fully rational
follower
NP
Finite Memory
Strategy
[Theorem 4.11]
Theory Of Reals No
Adversarial
bounded rational
follower
NP
Finite Memory
Strategy
[Theorem 4.5]
Theory Of Reals
[Theorem 5.5]
Solving LP
in EXPTime
[Theorem 5.8]
Yes
[Theorem 6.1]
(Requires Infinite
Memory
[Theorem 3.1])
Table 1: Summary of our results
RelatedWorks Stackelberg games on graphs have been first considered in [10], where the authors
study rational synthesis for ω-regular objectives in a setting where the followers are co-operative. In
[9], Stackelberg mean-payoff Games in adversarial setting, and Stackelberg discounted sum games
in both adversarial and co-operative setting have been considered. There, the authors postulate full
rationality of the follower; we relax that hypothesis here. In [11], mean-payoff Stackelberg games in
the co-operative setting have been studied. They did not considered the adversarial setting. In [14],
the authors study the effects of limited memory on both Nash and Stackelberg (or leader) equilibria
in multi-player discounted sum games. A Stackelberg equilibrium has been defined there as a profile
that gives the highest payoff to the leader among all the Stackelberg profiles. Stackelberg (leader)
equilibrium and incentive equilibrium over bi-matrix games have been studied in [12]. The authors
consider mixed strategies, and the existence of Nash equilibrium in bi-matrix games [18, 17] implies
the existence of leader and incentive equilibria. In [16], adversarial rational synthesis for ω-regular
objectives have been studied. In [7], precise complexity results for various ω-regular objectives have
been established for both adversarial and co-operative settings.
Incentive equilibrium has been studied in [13] for mean-payoff games in a co-operative setting.
The ability of the leader to incentivise her followers provides the leader with more freedom in
selecting strategy profiles, and thus can improve the payoff for the leader in such games even when
compared with Stackelberg games. In [5], the authors study secure Nash equilibrium, where each
player first maximises her own payoff, and then minimises the payoff of the other player. This
setting was studied for mean-payoff games in [3]. Player 0 and Player 1 are symmetric and not
asymmetric as in Stackelberg games.
Structure of the paper In Section 2, we introduce the necessary definitions and concepts used
in the paper. In Section 3, we examine the memory requirements of both players for playing their
strategies. In Section 4, we show that the threshold problem, i.e. given a rational c, checking
if ASVǫ > c, can be decided in NP, and if ASVǫ > c, then a finite memory strategy suffices to
achieve this threshold c. We present an improvement with respect to the memory requirement for
a previous result established in [9]. We also study the effect of limiting Player 0 to playing finite
memory strategies on the ASVǫ. The section ends with a result that the threshold problem is at
least as hard as the value problem of zero-sum mean-payoff games. In Section 5, we present an
algorithm to compute the ASVǫ in EXPTime. In Section 6, we show that the ASVǫ is always
achievable, which is in contrast with the framework of two-player Adversarial Stackelberg mean-
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payoff games where the ǫ is not fixed, as studied in [9]. We conclude in Section 7.
2 Preliminaries
We denote by N, N+, Q, and R the set of naturals, the set of naturals without 0, the set of rationals,
and the set of reals respectively.
Arenas An (bi-weighted) arena A = (V,E, 〈V0, V1〉, w0, w1) consists of a finite set V of vertices, a
set E ⊆ V ×V of edges such that for all v ∈ V there exists v′ ∈ V such that (v, v′) ∈ E, a partition
〈V0, V1〉 of V , where V0 (resp. V1) is the set of vertices for Player 0 (resp. Player 1), and two edge
weight functions w0 : E → Z, w1 : E → Z. In the sequel, we denote the maximum absolute value
of a weight in A by W . We refer to w0 and w1 as the weight functions assigning weights to the the
first dimension and the second dimension of an edge respectively. We assume in the sequel that
these weights are given in binary.
Plays and histories A play in A is an infinite sequence of vertices π = π0π1 · · · ∈ V
ω such that
for all k ∈ N, we have (πk, πk+1) ∈ E. We denote by PlaysA the set of plays in A, omitting the
subscript A when the underlying arena is clear from the context. Given π = π0π1 · · · ∈ PlaysA
and k ∈ N, the prefix π0π1 . . . πk of π (resp. suffix πkπk+1 . . . of π) is denoted by π6k (resp. π≥k).
A history in A is a (non-empty) prefix of a play in A. The length |h| of an history h = π6k is the
number |h| = k of its edges. We denote by HistA the set of histories in A; the symbol A is omitted
when clear from the context. Given i ∈ {0, 1} the set HistiA denotes the set of histories such that
their last vertex belongs to Vi. We denote the first vertex and the last vertex of a history h by
first(h) and last(h) respectively. We write h 6 π whenever h is a prefix of π.
Games A mean-payoff game G = (A, 〈MP0,MP1〉) consists of a bi-weighted arena A, a payoff
function MP0 : PlaysA → R for Player 0 and a payoff function MP1 : PlaysA → R for Player 1
which are defined as follows. Given a play π ∈ PlaysA and i ∈ {0, 1}, the payoff MPi(π) is given
by MPi(π) = lim inf
k→∞
1
k
wi(π6k), where the weight wi(h) of an history h ∈ Hist is the sum of the
weights assigned by wi to its edges. In our definition of the mean-payoff, we have used lim inf, we
will also need the lim sup case for technical reasons. Here is the formal definition together with
its notation: MPi(π) = lim sup
k→∞
1
k
wi(π6k). The size of the game G, denoted |G|, is the sum of the
number of vertices and edges appearing in the arena A.
Let V and E be respectively the set of vertices and the set of edges of G. The unfolding of the
game G starting from a vertex v ∈ V is a tree Tv(G) of infinite depth with its root v such that there
is a one-to-one correspondence between the set of plays π of G with first(π) = v and the branches
of Tv(G). Every node p ∈ V
+ of Tv(G) is a play p = v1 . . . vn in G, where v1 = v. There is an edge
from p = v1 . . . vn to p
′ = v1 . . . vnv
′
n iff (vn, v
′
n) ∈ E.
Strategies and payoffs A strategy for Player i ∈ {0, 1} in the game G = (A, 〈MP0,MP1〉)
is a function σ : HistiA → V that maps histories ending in a vertex v ∈ Vi to a successor of v. The
set of all strategies of Player i ∈ {0, 1} in the game G is denoted by Σi(G), or Σi when G is clear
from the context.
A strategy has memory M if it can be realized as the output of a state machine with M states.
A memoryless (or positional) strategy is a strategy with memory 1, that is, a function that only
depends on the last element of the given partial play. We denote by ΣMLi the set of memoryless
strategies of Player i, and ΣFMi her set of finite memory strategies. A profile is a pair of strategies
σ = (σ0, σ1), where σ0 ∈ Σ0(G) and σ1 ∈ Σ1(G). As we consider games with perfect information and
deterministic transitions, any profile σ yields, from any history h, a unique play or outcome, denoted
Outh(G, σ). Formally, Outh(G, σ) is the play π such that π6|h|−1 = h and ∀k > |h| − 1 it holds
that πk+1 = σi(π6k) if πk ∈ Vi. The set of outcomes (resp. histories) compatible with a strategy
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σ ∈ Σi∈{0,1}(G) after a history h is Outh(G, σ) = {π|∃σ
′ ∈ Σ1−i(G) such that π = Outh(G, (σ, σ
′))}
(resp. Histh(σ) = {h
′ ∈ Hist(G)|π ∈ Outh(G, σ), n ∈ N : h′ = π6n}.
Each outcome π ∈ G = (A, 〈MP0,MP1〉) yields a payoff MP(π) = (MP0(π),MP1(π)),
where MP0(π) is the payoff for Player 0 and MP1(π) is the payoff for Player 1. We denote
with MP(h, σ) =MP(Outh(G, σ)) the payoff of a profile of strategies σ after a history h.
Usually, we consider instances of games such that the players start playing at a fixed vertex v0.
Thus, we call an initialized game a pair (G, v0), where G is a game and v0 ∈ V is the initial vertex.
When the initial vertex v0 is clear from context, we use G, Out(G, σ), Out(G, σ), MP(σ) instead
of Gv0 , Outv0(G, σ), Outv0(G, σ), MPv0(σ). We sometimes simplify further the notation omitting
G when the latter is clear from the context.
Strongly Connected Components (SCC) In the mathematical theory of directed graphs, a
graph is said to be strongly connected if every vertex is reachable from every other vertex. A
Strongly Connected Component of a directed graph G is a subgraph that is strongly connected. In
the sequel, unless otherwise mentioned, we say that SCC is a strongly connected component of the
graph G which may or may not be maximal.
Best-responses and adversarial value Let G = (A, 〈MP0,MP1〉) be a two-dimensional mean-
payoff game on the bi-weighted arena A. Given a strategy σ0 for Player 0, we define two sets of
strategies for Player 1:
1. his best-responses to σ0, denoted by BR1(σ0), and defined as:
{σ1 ∈ Σ1|∀v ∈ V.∀σ
′
1 ∈ Σ1 :MP1(Outv(σ0, σ1)) >MP1(Outv(σ0, σ
′
1))}
2. his ǫ-best-responses to σ0, for ǫ > 0, denoted by BR
ǫ
1(σ0), and defined as:
{σ1 ∈ Σ1|∀v ∈ V.∀σ
′
1 ∈ Σ1 :MP1(Outv(σ0, σ1)) >MP1(Outv(σ0, σ
′
1))− ǫ}
Note that for the ǫ-best-response when ǫ > 0, we use > instead of >.
We also introduce the following notation for zero-sum games (that are needed as intermediary
steps in our algorithms). Let A be an arena, v ∈ V one of its states, and O ⊆ PlaysA be a set of
plays (called objective), then we write A, v ≪ i≫ O, if:
∃σi ∈ Σi.∀σ1−i ∈ Σ1−i : Outv(A, (σi, σ1−i)) ∈ O, for i ∈ {0, 1}
Here the underlying interpretation is zero-sum: Player i wants to force an outcome in O and Player
1 − i has the opposite goal. All the zero-sum games we consider in this paper are determined
meaning that for all A, for all objectives O ⊆ PlaysA we have that:
A, v ≪ i≫ O ⇐⇒ A, v 2≪ 1− i≫ PlaysA \ O
We sometimes simplify the notation omitting A when the arena being referenced is clear from the
context.
Convex hull and Fmin Given a dimension d, a finite set X ⊂ Qd of rational vectors, we define
the convex hull CH(X) = {v | v =
∑
x∈X αx · x ∧ ∀x ∈ X : αx ∈ [0, 1] ∧
∑
x∈X αx = 1} as the set
of all their convex combinations. Given a finite set of d-dimensional rational vectors X ⊂ Qd, let
fmin(X) be the vector v = (v1, v2, . . . , vn) where vi = min{c | ∃x ∈ X : xi = c} i.e. the vector v is
the pointwise minimum of the vectors in X. For S ⊆ Qd, we define Fmin(S) = {fmin(P ) | P is a
finite subset of S}.
Mean-payoffs induced by simple cycles Given a play π ∈ PlaysA, we denote by inf(π) the set
of vertices v that appear infinitely many times along π, i.e., inf(π) = {v ∈ V | ∀in ∈ N · ∃j ∈ N, j >
6
i : π(j) = v}. It is easy to see that inf(π) forms an SCC in the underlying graph of the arena A.
A cycle c is a sequence of edges that starts and stops in a given vertex v, it is simple if it does not
contain repetition of any other vertex. Given an SCC S, we write C(S) for the set of simple cycles
inside S. Given a simple cycle c, for i ∈ {0, 1}, let MPi(c) =
wi(c)
|c|
1 be the mean of the weights
in each dimension along the edges in the simple cycle c, and we call the pair (MP0(c),MP1(c))
the mean-payoff coordinate of the cycle c. We write CH(C(S)) for the convex-hull of the set of
mean-payoff coordinates of simple cycles of S.
Lemma 2.1. ([9, 4]) Let S be an SCC in the arena A with a set V of vertices, the following three
properties hold:
1. for all π ∈ PlaysA, if inf(π) ⊆ S, then (MP0(π),MP1(π)) ∈ Fmin(CH(C(S)))
2. for all (x, y) ∈ Fmin(CH(C(S))), there exists a play π ∈ PlaysA such that inf(π) = S and
(MP0(π),MP1(π)) = (x, y).
3. The set Fmin(CH(C(S))) is effectively expressible in 〈R,+, <〉 as a conjunction of O(m2) linear
inequations, where m is the number of mean-payoff coordinates of simple cycles in S, which
is O(W · |V |). Hence this set of inequations can be pseudopolynomial in size.
Adversarial Stackelberg Value for MP As the set of best-responses in mean-payoff games can
be empty, we use the notion of ǫ-best-responses for the definition of ASV which are guaranteed to
always exist. We now define:
ASV(v) = sup
σ0∈Σ0,ǫ>0|BR
ǫ
1(σ0)6=∅
inf
σ1∈BR
ǫ
1(σ0)
MP0(Outv(σ0, σ1))
We also associate a (adversarial) value to a strategy σ0 ∈ Σ0 of Player 0:
ASV(σ0)(v) = sup
ǫ>0|BRǫ1(σ0)6=∅
inf
σ1∈BR
ǫ
1(σ0)
MP0(Outv(σ0, σ1))
Clearly, we have that:
ASV(v) = sup
σ0∈Σ0
ASV(σ0)(v)
Given an ǫ > 0, we define an adversarial value for Player 0 as:
ASVǫ(v) = sup
σ0∈Σ0
inf
σ1∈BR
ǫ
1(σ0)
MP0(Outv(σ0, σ1))
Clearly, we have that:
ASV(v) = sup
ǫ>0
ASVǫ(v)
We also define the adversarial Stackelberg value, where strategies of Player 0 are restricted to finite
memory:
ASVǫFM(v) = sup
σ0∈ΣFM0
inf
σ1∈BR
ǫ
1(σ0)
MP0(Outv(σ0, σ1))
where ΣFM0 refers to the set of all finite memory strategies of Player 0.
Achievability of ASVǫ Given ǫ > 0, we have that ASVǫ(v) = c is achievable in a mean-payoff
game G from a vertex v, if there exists a strategy σ0 for Player 0 such that
∀σ1 ∈ BR
ǫ
1(σ0) :MP0(Outv(σ0, σ1)) > c
In the sequel, unless otherwise mentioned, we refer to a two-dimensional non-zero sum two-player
mean-payoff game simply as a mean-payoff game.
1We do not use MPi since lim inf and lim sup are the same for a finite sequence of edges
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v0v1 v2
start
(0,0)
(0,1)
(2,0)(0,2+2ǫ)
(0,0)
(0,1)
Figure 4: Finite memory strategy of Player 0
may not achieve ASVǫ(v0).
v0v1 v2
start
(1,1)
(0,1)
(0,2)
(1,1)
(0,1)
Figure 5: An example in which a finite mem-
ory strategy for Player 0 suffices to achieve
ASVǫ(v0).
3 ASVǫ for a fixed ǫ
In this section, we study the memory requirements for the strategies of both Player 0 and Player 1.
First we show that there exists a mean-payoff game G in which Player 0 needs an infinite memory
strategy to achieve the ASVǫ.
We also show that there exists a mean-payoff game G in which the ASVǫ can be achieved using
a finite memory (but not memoryless) strategy for Player 0.
Theorem 3.1. There exists a mean-payoff game G, a vertex v in G, and an ǫ > 0 such that Player
0 needs an infinite memory strategy to achieve the ASVǫ(v).
Proof. Consider the example in Figure 4. We show that in this example the ASVǫ(v0) = 1, and
that this value can only be achieved using an infinite memory strategy. Assume a strategy σ0 for
Player 0 such that the game is played in rounds. In round k
- if Player 1 plays v0 → v0 repeatedly at least k times before playing v0 → v1, then from v1, play
v1 → v1 repeatedly k times and then play v1 → v0 and move to round k + 1;
- else, if Player 1 plays v0 → v0 less than k times before playing v0 → v1, then from v1 , play
v1 → v0.
The best-response for Player 1 to strategy σ0 would be to choose k sequentially as k = 1, 2, 3, . . . ,
to get a play π = ((v0)
i(v1)
i)i∈N. We have that MP1(π) = 1 + ǫ and MP0(π) = 1. Player 1 can
sacrifice an amount that is less than ǫ to minimize the mean-payoff of Player 0, and thus he
would not like to play v0 → v2. In particular, a strategy σ1 of Player 1 that prescribes playing
the edge v0 → v2 some time yields a mean-payoff of 1 for Player 1, and hence we conclude that
σ1 /∈ BR
ǫ
1(σ0). Player 1 cannot play any other strategy without increasing the mean-payoff of
Player 0 and/or decreasing his own payoff. We can see that Player 1 does not have a finite memory
best-response strategy. Thus, the ASVǫ(σ0)(v0) = 1.
We claim that ASVǫ(σ0)(v0) = ASV
ǫ(v0). For every strategy σ1 of Player 1 such that σ1 ∈
BRǫ1(σ0), we note that the higher the payoff Player 1 has, the lower is the payoff for Player 0. For
every other strategy σ′0 of Player 0, if best-response of Player 1 to σ
′
0 gives a mean-payoff less than
1+ ǫ, then Player 1 will switch to v2, thus giving Player 0 a payoff of 0. If best-response of Player 1
to σ′0 gives a mean-payoff greater than 1 + ǫ, then Player 0 will have a lower ASV
ǫ(σ′0).
Now we show that a finite memory strategy of Player 0 cannot achieve an ASVǫ(v0) of 1.
Consider a finite memory strategy of Player 0. If Player 1 has an infinite memory ǫ-best-response
which cannot be encoded by finite memory, it can only lead to looping over v0 more and more, this
gives him a payoff which is eventually 0. Thus consider a finite memory response of Player 1 to the
finite memory strategy of Player 0. Note that Player 0 would choose a finite memory strategy such
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v0v1 v2
start
(0,0)
(0,0)
(0,3)(3,0)
(0,0)
(1,0)
Figure 6: No finite memory ǫ-best-response of Player 1 exists for a strategy σ0 of Player 0
that the best-response of Player 1 gives him a value of at least 1 + ǫ. Also since both players have
finite memory strategies, the resultant outcome is a regular play over vertices v0 and v1. In every
such regular play, the effect of the edge from v0 to v1 and the edge from v1 to v0 is non-negligible,
and hence if the payoff of Player 1 is at least 1 + ǫ, the payoff of Player 0 will be less than 1. Thus
no finite memory strategy can achieve an ASVǫ that is equal to 1.
The following example shows the existence of mean-payoff games in which Player 0 can achieve
the adversarial value with finite memory (but not memoryless) strategies.
Theorem 3.2. There exists a mean-payoff game G, a vertex v in G, and an ǫ > 0 such that a finite
memory strategy of Player 0 suffices to achieve ASVǫ(v).
Proof. Consider the example in Figure 5. We show that ASVǫ(v0) = 1 − ǫ. Assume a strategy
σ0 for Player 0 defined as: repeat forever, from v1 play j times v1 → v1, and then repeat playing
v1 → v0 for k times, with j and k chosen such that mean-payoff for Player 0 is equal to 1 − ǫ.
For every rational ǫ, such a k always exists. In this example, we have that k = 1−ǫ2ǫ j. The ǫ-best-
response of Player 1 to σ0 is to always play v0 → v1 as by playing this edge forever, Player 1 gets
a mean-payoff equal to 1 + ǫ, whereas if Player 1 plays v0 → v2, then Player 1 receives a payoff of
1. Since 1 ≯ (1 + ǫ)− ǫ, a strategy of Player 1 that chooses v0 → v2 is not an ǫ-best-response for
Player 1, thus forcing Player 1 to play v0 → v1. Thus ASV
ǫ(v0) is achieved with a finite memory
strategy of size k for Player 0. Note that this size k is a function of ǫ.
We can now show that there exists a mean-payoff game such that for a given strategy σ0 of
Player 0, and for a given ǫ > 0, there may not exist a finite memory strategy of Player 1 that is an
ǫ-best-response to σ0.
Theorem 3.3. There exists a mean-payoff game G and an ǫ > 0 such that for some Player 0
strategy σ0, for every Player 1 strategy σ1 ∈ BR
ǫ
1(σ0), we have that σ1 is not a finite memory
strategy.
Proof. Consider the example in Figure 6, and the following strategy σ0 of Player 0. Player 0 loops
over v0 i times, and then sends the token back to v1. Player 1 loops over v1 k times, and then sends
the token to v0. If k > i, then Player 0 increases i by 1, and repeats the above, otherwise she sends
the token to v2. Clearly for all ǫ 6 1.5, no finite memory strategy is an ǫ-best-response to σ0.
4 Threshold Problem for ASVǫ
In this section, given a rational c, we study the threshold problem of determining if ASVǫ(v) > c
for a mean-payoff game G and where v is a vertex in G.
We start by showing that if ASVǫ(v) > c, then there exists a strategy σ0 for Player 0 that
enforces ASVǫ(σ0)(v) > c.
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Lemma 4.1. For all mean-payoff games G, for all vertices v in G, for all ǫ > 0, and for all rationals
c, we have that ASVǫ(v) > c iff there exists a strategy σ0 ∈ Σ0 such that ASV
ǫ(σ0)(v) > c.
Proof. The right to left direction of the proof is trivial as σ0 can play the role of witness for
ASVǫ(v) > c, i.e., if there exists a strategy σ0 of Player 0 such that ASV
ǫ(σ0)(v) > c, then ASV
ǫ(v) >
c.
For the left to right direction of the proof, let ASVǫ(v) = c′. By definition of ASVǫ(v), we have
that c′ = sup
σ0∈Σ0
ASVǫ(σ0)(v).
By definition of sup, for all δ > 0, there exists σδ0 such that ASV
ǫ(σδ0)(v) > c
′ − δ.
Let us consider a δ > 0 such that c′ − δ > c. Such a δ exists as c′ > c. Then we have that there
exists σ0 such that ASV
ǫ(σ0)(v) > c
′ − δ > c.
Witnesses for ASVǫ For a mean-payoff game G and an ǫ > 0, we associate with each vertex v in
G, the following set of pairs of real numbers:
Λǫ(v) = {(c, d) ∈ R2 | v ≪ 1≫MP0 6 c ∧MP1 > d− ǫ}
We say that a vertex v is (c, d)ǫ-bad if (c, d) ∈ Λǫ(v). Let c′ ∈ R. A play π in G is called a (c′, d)ǫ-
witness of ASVǫ(v) > c if (MP0(π),MP1(π)) = (c
′, d) where c′ > c, and π does not contain
any (c, d)ǫ-bad vertex. A play π is called a witness of ASVǫ(v) > c if it is a (c′, d)ǫ-witness of
ASVǫ(v) > c for some c′, d. The following theorem states the existence of a witness.
A similar result has been established in [9] where the authors show that ASV(v) > c if and
only if there exists a witness for ASV(v) > c. However, proving the direction that if ASVǫ(v) > c,
then there exists a witness for ASVǫ(v) > c is more challenging in our case, and requires a different
proof technique.
Theorem 4.2. For all mean-payoff games G, for all vertices v in G, for all ǫ > 0, and for all
rationals c, we have that ASVǫ(v) > c if and only if there exists a (c′, d)ǫ-witness of ASVǫ(v) > c,
where d is some rational.
Proof. First we prove the right to left direction, i.e., we are given a play π in G that starts from v
and the play π is such that (MP0(π),MP1(π)) = (c
′, d) for c′ > c and does not cross a (c, d)ǫ-bad
vertex. We need to prove that ASVǫ(v) > c. We do this by defining a strategy σ0 for Player 0,
such that ASVǫ(σ0)(v) > c:
1. ∀h 6 π, if last(h) is a Player 0 vertex, the strategy σ0 is such that σ0(h) follows π.
2. ∀h 
 π, where there has been a deviation from π by Player 1, we assume that Player 0
switches to a punishing strategy defined as follows: In the subgame after history h′ where
last(h′) is the first vertex from which Player 1 deviates from π, we know that Player 0 has a
strategy to enforce the objective: MP0 > c ∨MP1 6 d− ǫ. This is true because π does not
cross any (c, d)ǫ-bad vertex and since n-dimensional mean-payoff games are determined.
Let us now establish that the strategy σ0 satisfies ASV
ǫ(σ0)(v) > c. First note that, since
MP1(π) = d, we have that sup
σ1∈BR
ǫ
1(σ0)
MP1(Outv(σ0, σ1)) > d. Now consider some strategy σ
′
1 ∈
BRǫ1(σ0) and let π
′ = Outv(σ0, σ
′
1). Clearly, π
′ is such thatMP1(π
′) > sup
σ1∈BR
ǫ
1(σ0)
MP1(Outv(σ0, σ1))−
ǫ > d − ǫ. If π′ = π, we know that MP0(π
′) > c. If π′ 6= π, then when π′ deviates from π
we know that Player 0 employs the punishing strategy, thus making sure that MP0(π
′) > c ∨
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MP1(π
′) 6 d− ǫ. Since σ′1 ∈ BR
ǫ
1(σ0), it must be true that MP0(π
′) > c. Thus, ∀σ′1 ∈ BR
ǫ
1(σ0),
we have MP0(Outv(σ0, σ
′
1)) > c. Therefore, ASV
ǫ(σ0)(v) > c, which implies ASV
ǫ(v) > c.
Now we consider the left to right direction of the proof, i.e., we are given that ASVǫ(v) > c.
Hence by Lemma 4.1, there exists a strategy σ0 for Player 0 such that ASV
ǫ(σ0)(v) > c. Thus,
there exists a δ > 0, such that
inf
σ1∈BR
ǫ
1(σ0)
MP0(Outv(σ0, σ1)) = c
′ = c+ δ
Let d = sup
σ1∈BR
ǫ
1(σ0)
MP1(Outv(σ0, σ1)). We first prove that for all σ1 ∈ BR
ǫ
1(σ0), we have
that Outv(σ0, σ1) does not cross a (c, d)
ǫ-bad vertex. For every σ1 ∈ BR
ǫ
1(σ0), we let πσ1 =
Outv(σ0, σ1). We note that MP1(πσ1) > d − ǫ and MP0(πσ1) > c. For every π
′ ∈ Outv(σ0),
we know that if MP1(π
′) > d − ǫ, then there exists a strategy σ′1 ∈ BR
ǫ
1(σ0) such that π
′ =
Outv(σ0, σ
′
1). This means that MP0(π
′) > c. Thus we can see that every deviation from πσ1
either gives Player 1 a mean-payoff that is at most d− ǫ or Player 0 a mean-payoff greater than c.
Therefore, we conclude that πσ1 does not cross any (c, d)
ǫ-bad vertex.
Now consider a sequence (σi)i∈N of Player 1 strategies such that σi ∈ BR
ǫ
1(σ0) for all i ∈ N, and
lim
i→∞
MP1(Outv(σ0, σi)) = d. Let πi = Outv(σ0, σi). Let inf(πi) be the set of vertices that occur
infinitely often in πi, and let Vπi be the set of vertices appearing along the play πi. Since there are
finitely many SCCs, w.l.o.g., we can assume that for all i, j ∈ N, we have that inf(πi) = inf(πj),
that is, all the plays end up in the same SCC, say S, and also Vπi = Vπj = Vπ (say). Note that
S ⊆ Vπ.
Note that for every ǫ ≥ δ > 0, there is a strategy σδ1 ∈ BR
ǫ
1(σ0) of Player 1, and a corresponding
play π′ = Outv(σ0, σ
δ
1) such that MP1(π
′) > d− δ, and MP0(π
′) > c′. Also the set Vπ′ of vertices
appearing in π′ be such that Vπ′ ⊆ Vπ, and inf(π
′) ⊆ S.
Now since Fmin(CH(C(S))) is a closed set, we have that (cˆ, d) ∈ Fmin(CH(C(S))) for some cˆ
where cˆ > c′ > c. By Lemma 2.1, there exists a play π∗ such that (MP0(π
∗),MP1(π
∗)) = (c′′, d).
Also inf(π∗) ⊆ S, and Vπ∗ ⊆ Vπ. The proof follows since for all vertices v ∈ Vπ, we have that v is
not (c, d)ǫ-bad.
Now, we establish a small witness property to establish that the threshold problem is in NP.
Lemma 4.3. For all mean-payoff games G, for all vertices v in G, for all ǫ > 0, and for all rationals
c, we have that ASVǫ(v) > c if and only if there exist three acyclic plays π1, π2, π3, and two simple
cycles l1, l2 such that:
1. first(π1) = v, first(π2) = last(π1), first(π3) = last(π2), first(π2) = last(π3), and first(π2) =
first(l1), and first(π3) = first(l2).
2. there exist α, β ∈ Q+, where α+ β = 1, such that:
(a) α ·MP0(l1) + β ·MP0(l2) = c
′ > c
(b) α ·MP1(l1) + β ·MP1(l2) = d, for some rational d
Furthermore, α, β, and d can be chosen so that they can be represented with a polynomial
number of bits.
3. there is no (c, d)ǫ-bad vertex v′ along π1, π2, π3, l1 and l2.
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Proof. This proof is similar to the proof of Lemma 8 in [9]. For the right to left direction of the
proof, where we are given finite acyclic plays π1, π2, π3, simple cycles l1 and l2 and constants α, β,
we consider the witness π = π1ρ1ρ2ρ3 . . . where, for all i ∈ N, we let ρi = l
[α·i]
1 .π2.l
[β·i]
2 .π3. We know
that MP1(π) = α ·MP1(l1) + β ·MP1(l2) = d and MP0(π) = α ·MP0(l1) + β ·MP0(l2) > c. For
all vertices v in π1, π2, π3, l1 and l2, it is given that v is not (c, d)
ǫ-bad. Therefore, π is a suitable
witness thus proving from Theorem 4.2 that ASVǫ(v) > c.
For the left to right direction of the proof, we are given ASVǫ(v) > c. Using Theorem 4.2, we
can construct a play π such that MP0(π) > c and MP1(π) = d, and π does not cross a (c, d)
ǫ-bad
vertex, i.e., for all vertices v′ appearing in π, we have that v′ 2≪ 1 ≫MP0 6 c ∧MP1 > d − ǫ.
First, the value d must be chosen so that the vertices v′ appearing in π do not belong to the (c, d)ǫ-
bad vertices. Let inf(π) = S be the set of vertices appearing infinitely often in π. Note that S
forms an SCC. By abuse of notation, we also denote this SCC by S here. By Lemma 2.1, we have
that (MP0(π),MP1(π)) ∈ Fmin(CH(C(S))). From Proposition 1 of [4], for a bi-weighted arena,
we have that Fmin(CH(C(S))) = CH(Fmin(C(S))). Since CH(Fmin(C(S))) can be expressed using
conjunctions of linear inequations whose coefficients have polynomial number of bits, the same also
follows for Fmin(CH(C(S))) in a bi-weighted arena. In addition, it is proven in [2] that the set
Λǫ(v′) is definable by a disjunction of conjunctions of linear inequations whose coefficients have
polynomial number of bits in the descriptions of the game G and of ǫ. Hence Λ
ǫ
(v′) is also definable
by a disjunction of conjunctions of linear inequations whose coefficients have polynomial number of
bits in the descriptions of the game G and of ǫ. As a consequence of Theorem 2 in [2] which states
that given a system of linear inequations that is satisfiable, there exists a point with polynomial
representation that satisfies the system, we have that d can be chosen such that (c, d) ∈ Λ
ǫ
(v′) and
(MP0(π), d) ∈ Fmin(CH(C(S))), and hence d can be represented with a polynomial number of bits.
Second, following the proof of Lemma 8 in [9], and by applying the Carathe´odory baricenter
theorem, we can find two simple cycles l1, l2 in the SCC S and acyclic finite plays π1, π2 and
π3 from π, and two positive rational constants α, β ∈ Q+, such that first(π1) = v, first(π2) =
last(π1), first(π3) = last(π2), first(π2) = last(π3), and first(π2) = first(l1), and first(π3) = first(l2),
and α + β = 1, α ·MP0(l1) + β ·MP0(l2) > c and α ·MP1(l1) + β ·MP1(l2) = d. Again, using
Theorem 2 in [2], we can assume that α and β are rational values that can be represented using
a polynomial number of bits. We note that for all vertices v in π1, π2, π3, l1 and l2, we have that v
is not (c, d)ǫ-bad.
In this work, we show that we can further improve the witness for ASVǫ(v) > c by showing
the existence of a regular witness.
Theorem 4.4. For all mean-payoff games G, for all vertices v in G, for all ǫ > 0, and for all
rationals c, we have that ASVǫ(v) > c if and only if there exists a regular (c′, d)ǫ-witness of
ASVǫ(v) > c, where d is some rational.
Proof. We only focus on the left to right direction since the proof of the other direction is exactly
the same as in the proof of Theorem 4.2.
Consider the witness π in the proof of Lemma 4.3. We construct a regular-witness π′ for
ASVǫ(v) > c where π′ = π1.(l
[α′·k]
1 .π2.l
[β′·k]
2 .π3)
ω and α′, β′ are constants in Q and k is some large
integer. We construct π′ by modifying π as follows. We need to consider the following cases.
Case 1: MP0(l1) >MP0(l2) and MP1(l1) <MP1(l2)
Here, one simple cycle, l1, increases Player 0’s mean-payoff while the other simple cycle, l2, increases
Player 1’s mean-payoff. We can build a witness π′ = π1.(l
[α·k]
1 .π2.l
[(β+τ)·k]
2 .π3)
ω for some very large
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k ∈ N and for some small τ > 0 such that MP0(π
′) > c and MP1(π
′) = d.2 We note that k and τ
are polynomial in the size of G, and the largest weight W appearing on the edges of G.
Case 2: MP0(l1) <MP0(l2) and MP1(l1) >MP1(l2)
This is analogous to case 1, and proceeds as mentioned above.
Case 3: MP0(l1) >MP0(l2) and MP1(l1) >MP1(l2)
One cycle, l1, increases both Player 0 and Player 1’s mean-payoffs, while the other, l1, decreases it.
In this case, we can just omit one of the cycles and consider the one that gives a larger mean-payoff,
to get a finite memory strategy. Thus, π′ = π1.l
ω
1 and we getMP0(π
′) > c ,MP1(π
′) > d. Suppose
MP1(π
′) = d′ > d. Since no vertex in π1, π2, π3, l1, and l2 is (c, d)
ǫ-bad, we also have that they
are not (c, d′)ǫ-bad, and thus π′ is a witness for ASVǫ(v) > c.
Case 4: MP0(l1) <MP0(l2) and MP1(l1) <MP1(l2)
This is analogous to case 3, and proceeds as mentioned above.
In each of these cases, we have that ASVǫ(v) > c: MP0(π
′) > c and MP1(π
′) > d. Since we
know that π does not cross a (c, d)ǫ-bad vertex, and the vertices of the play π′ are a subset of the
vertices of the play π, we have that π′ is a witness for ASVǫ(v) > c.
Now, we state the following theorem that establishes the NP-membership of ASVǫ(v) > c.
Theorem 4.5. For all mean-payoff games G, for all vertices v in G, for all ǫ > 0, and for all
rationals c, it can be decided in non-deterministic polynomial time if ASVǫ(v) > c, and a pseu-
dopolynomial memory strategy of Player 0 suffices for this threshold.
For proving Theorem 4.5, we start by stating a property of multi-dimensional mean-payoff games
proved in [20] that we rephrase here for a two-dimensional mean-payoff game. This property
expresses a relation between mean-payoff lim sup and mean-payoff lim inf objectives. We recall
that in [20], the objective of Player 1 is to maximize the payoff in each dimension, i.e., for two-
dimensional setting, given two rational c and d, Player 1 wins if he has a winning strategy for
MP0 > c∧MP1 > d; otherwise Player 0 wins due to determinacy of multi-dimensional mean-payoff
games. We call the mean-payoff game setting in [20] 2D-max mean-payoff games to distinguish it
from the mean-payoff games that we consider here. Later we will relate the two settings.
Proposition 4.6. (Lemma 14 in [20]) For all mean-payoff games G, for all vertices v in the
game G, and for all rationals c, d, we have
v ≪ 1≫MP0 > c ∧MP1 > d
if and only if
v ≪ 1≫MP0 > c ∧MP1 > d
We now recall another property of multi-dimensional mean-payoff games proved in [20] that we
rephrase here for a 2D-max mean-payoff game. This property expresses a bound on the weight of
every finite play πf ∈ Outv(σ0) where σ0 is a memoryless winning strategy for Player 0.
Lemma 4.7. (Lemma 10 in [20]) For all 2D-max mean-payoff games G, for all vertices v in
G, and for all rationals c, d, if Player 0 3 wins MP0 < c ∨MP1 < d from v then she has a
memoryless winning strategy σ0 to do so, and there exist three constants mG , cG , dG ∈ R such that:
2For more details, we refer the reader to the Appendix.
3Player 0 is called Player 2 in [20]
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cG < c, dG < d, and for all finite plays π
f ∈ Outv(σ0), i.e. starting from v and compatible with σ0,
we have that
w0(π
f ) 6 mG + cG · |π
f |
or
w1(π
f ) 6 mG + dG · |π
f |
We now relate the 2D-max mean-payoff game in [20] where the objective of Player 1 is to
maximize the payoff in both dimensions to our setting where in a game G, Player 1 maximizes
the payoff in the second dimension, and minimizes the payoff on the first dimension from his set
of available responses to a strategy of Player 0. The objective of Player 0 then is to maximize
the payoff in the first dimension and minimize the payoff in the second dimension, i.e. given two
rationals c and d, Player 0’s objective is to ensure v ≪ 0≫MP0 > c ∨MP1 < d. We now state
a modification of Lemma 4.7 as follows:
Lemma 4.8. For all mean-payoff games G, for all vertices v in G, and for all rationals c, d, if
Player 0 wins MP0 > c ∨MP1 < d from v, then she has a memoryless winning strategy σ0 to do
so, and there exist three constants mG , cG , dG ∈ R such that cG > c, dG < d, and for all finite plays
πf ∈ Outv(σ0), i.e. starting in v and compatible with σ0, we have that
w0(π
f ) > −mG + cG · |π
f |
or
w1(π
f ) 6 mG + dG · |π
f |
Proof. We show this by a reduction to a 2D-max mean-payoff game where Player 0’s objective is
to ensure v ≪ 0≫MP0 < c ∨MP1 < d in a 2D-max mean-payoff game.
We prove this lemma in two parts. If Player 0 wins MP0 > c ∨MP1 < d, we show (i) the
existence of a memoryless strategy σ0 for Player 0, and (ii) that there exist three constants
mG , cG , dG ∈ R such that cG > c, dG < d, and for all finite plays πf ∈ Outv(σ0), i.e. starting from v
and compatible with σ0, we have that either w0(π
f ) > −mG + cG · |π
f | or w1(π
f ) 6 mG + dG · |π
f |.
Assume that Player 0 has a winning strategy from vertex v in G for MP0 > c ∨MP1 < d.
To prove (i), we subtract 2c from the weights on the first dimension of all the edges, followed by
multiplying them with -1. We call the resultant 2D-max mean-payoff game G′, and we have that
v ≪ 0 ≫ MP0 > c ∨MP1 < d in G if and only if v ≪ 0 ≫ MP0 < c ∨MP1 < d in G
′.
Using Proposition 4.6 and determinacy of multi-dimensional mean-payoff games, it follows that
v ≪ 0 ≫ MP0 > c ∨MP1 < d in G if and only if v ≪ 0 ≫ MP0 < c ∨MP1 < d in G
′. Also
from [20], we have that if Player 0 has a winning strategy in G′ for MP0 < c ∨MP1 < d, then she
has a memoryless strategy σ0 for the same, and the proof of Lemma 14 in [20] shows that same
memoryless strategy σ0 is also winning for MP0 < c ∨MP1 < d, thus concluding that if Player 0
wins MP0 > c ∨MP1 < d in G from vertex v, then she has a memoryless winning strategy.
We prove (ii) by contradiction. Assume that Player 0 winsMP0 > c∨MP1 < d from vertex v in
G, and by part (i), she has a memoryless winning strategy σ0. Assume for contradiction, that there
does not exist three constants mG, cG , dG ∈ R such that cG > c, dG < d, such that for all finite plays
πf ∈ Outv(σ0), i.e. starting in v and compatible with σ0, we have either w0(π
f ) > −mG + cG · |π
f |
or w1(π
f ) 6 mG + dG · |π
f |.
Consider the steps in the construction of G′ as defined above. As we subtract 2c from the weights
on the first dimension of each edge, and multiply the resultant weights on the first dimension by
-1, we have that there does not exist three constants mG , cG , dG ∈ R such that cG > c, dG < d, and
for all finite plays πf ∈ Outv(σ0) in G, i.e. starting from v and compatible with σ0, we have either
w0(π
f ) > −mG + cG · |π
f |
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or
w1(π
f ) 6 mG + dG · |π
f |
if and only if there does not exist three constants mG, cG , dG ∈ R such that cG > c, dG < d, and
for all finite plays πf ∈ Outv(σ0) in the 2D-max mean-payoff game G
′ for the objective MP0 <
c ∨MP1 < d, i.e. starting in v and compatible with σ0, we have either
w0(π
f ) 6 mG + (2c− cG) · |π
f |
or
w1(π
f ) 6 mG + dG · |π
f |
Let 2c − cG = c
′
G , and we have that c
′
G < c. Now since σ0 is a winning for Player 0 for the
objective MP0 < c∨MP1 < d in G
′ from v, we reach a contradiction by Lemma 4.7, and due to
determinacy of multi-dimensional mean-payoff games.
Using Lemma 4.8, we can now prove that Player 0 can ensure from a vertex v that v 2≪ 1 ≫
MP0 6 c ∧MP1 > d if and only if she can also ensure that v 2≪ 1 ≫MP0 6 c ∧MP1 > d
′ for
all d′ > d. This is established in the following lemma.
Lemma 4.9. For all mean-payoff games G, for all vertices v ∈ G, and for all rationals c, d, we
have that:
v ≪ 1≫MP0 6 c ∧MP1 > d
if and only if there exists a d′ ∈ R, where d′ > d such that
v ≪ 1≫MP0 6 c ∧MP1 > d
′
Proof. For the right to left direction of the proof, it is trivial to see that if v ≪ 1 ≫ MP0 6
c ∧MP1 > d
′ for some d′ > d, then we have that v ≪ 1≫MP0 6 c ∧MP1 > d.
For the left to right direction of the proof, we prove the contrapositive, i.e., we assume that
∀d′ > d, we have v 2≪ 1 ≫ MP0 6 c ∧MP1 > d
′. Now we prove that v 2≪ 1 ≫ MP0 6
c ∧MP1 > d.
Since ∀d′ > d, Player 1 loses MP0 6 c ∧MP1 > d
′ from a given vertex v, due to determinacy
of multi-dimensional mean-payoff games, Player 0 wins MP0 > c ∨MP1 < d
′ from vertex v. By
Lemma 4.8, Player 0 has a memoryless strategy σ0 to achieve the objective MP0 > c∨MP1 < d
′
from vertex v. Note that Player 0 has only finitely many memoryless strategies. Therefore there
exists a strategy σ∗0 that achieves the objective v ≪ 0 ≫ MP0 > c ∨MP1 < d
′ for all d′ > d.
Now from Lemma 4.7, for every d′ > d, there exists three constants mG , cG , d
′
G ∈ R such that
cG > c, d
′
G < d
′, and for all finite plays πf ∈ Outv(σ
∗
0), we have that
w0(π
f ) > −mG + cG · |π
f |
or
w1(π
f ) 6 mG + d
′
G · |π
f |
Note that since the above is true for every d′ > d, we can indeed consider a dG ∈ R, where
dG 6 d, such that for all d
′ > d, and for all finite plays πf ∈ Outv(σ
∗
0), we have that
w0(π
f ) > −mG + cG · |π
f |
or we have that
w1(π
f ) 6 mG + dG · |π
f |
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Hence, for every play π ∈ Outv(σ
∗
0), we have that
MP0(π) > cG ∨MP1(π) 6 dG
Thus, we get
v ≪ 0≫MP0 > cG ∨MP1 6 dG
⇐⇒ v ≪ 0≫MP0 > c ∨MP1 < d
′ for every d′ > d, since cG > c, dG < d
′
We now construct a 2D-max mean-payoff game G′ from the given game G by multiplying the
first dimension of the weights of all the edges by −1. Thus, in the game G′, we get
v ≪ 0≫MP0 < −c ∨MP1 < d
′ for every d′ > d
⇐⇒ v ≪ 0≫MP0 < −c ∨MP1 < d
′ for every d′ > d (from Proposition 4.6)
We now construct a game G′′ from the game G′ by multiplying the first dimension of the weights
of all the edges by -1. Note that, we get back the original game G after this modification, i.e. G′′
has the same arena as that of G. Thus, in the game G, we have that
v ≪ 0≫MP0 > c ∨MP1 < d
′ for every d′ > d
Recall by Lemma 4.8, if Player 0 wins MP0 > c∨MP1 < d
′, then she has a memoryless strategy
for this objective, and since there are finitely many memoryless strategies, there exists a memoryless
strategy σ∗0 of Player 0 that wins for all d
′ > d. This also implies that by using σ∗0 , from vertex v,
Player 0 can ensure MP0 > c ∨MP1 6 d, that is,
v ≪ 0≫MP0 > c ∨MP1 6 d
⇐⇒ v 2≪ 1≫MP0 6 c ∧MP1 > d (by determinacy of multi-dimensional mean-payoff games).
We now have all the ingredients to prove Theorem 4.5.
Proof of Theorem 4.5. According to Lemma 4.3, we consider a non-deterministic Turing ma-
chine that establishes the membership to NP by guessing a reachable SCC S, a finite play π1 to
reach S from v, two simple cycles l1, l2, along with two finite plays π2 and π3 that connects the two
simple cycles, and parameters α, β ∈ Q+. Additionally, for each vertex v′ that appear along the
plays π1, π2 and π3, and on the simple cycles l1 and l2, the Turing machine guesses a memoryless
strategy σv
′
0 for Player 0 that establishes v
′ 2≪ 1 ≫ MP0 6 c ∧MP1 > d − ǫ which implies by
determinacy of multi-dimensional mean-payoff games, that v′ ≪ 0≫MP0 > c ∨MP1 6 d− ǫ.
Besides, from Theorem 4.4, we can obtain a regular witness π′. Using π′, we build a finite
memory strategy σFM0 for Player 0 as stated below:
1. Player 0 follows π′ if Player 1 does not deviate from π′. The finite memory strategy stems
from the finite k as required in the proof of Theorem 4.4.
2. For each vertex v′ ∈ π′, Player 0 employs the memoryless strategy σv
′
0 that establishes v
′ 2≪
1≫MP0 6 c ∧MP1 > d− ǫ. The existence of such a memoryless strategy follows from the
proof of Lemma 4.9.
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It remains to show that all the guesses can be verified in polynomial time. The only difficult part
concerns the memoryless strategies of Player 0 to punish deviations of Player 1 from the witness
play π′. These memoryless strategies are used to prove that the witness does not cross (c, d)ǫ-bad
vertices. For vertex v′ ∈ π′, we consider a memoryless strategy σv
′
0 , and we need to establish that
it can enforce MP0 > c ∨MP1 6 d− ǫ. Towards this, we adapt the proof of Lemma 10 in [20],
which in turn is based on the polynomial time algorithm of Kosaraju and Sullivan [15] for detecting
zero-cycles in multi-weighted directed graphs.
Consider the bi-weighted graph obtained from G by fixing the choices of Player 0 according to
the memoryless strategy σv
′
0 . We first compute the set of maximal SCCs that are reachable from
v′ in this bi-weighted graph. This can be done in linear time. For each SCC S, we need to check
that Player 1 cannot achieve MP0 6 c ∧MP1 > d− ǫ.
We first recall the definition of multi-cycles from [20], which is a multi-set of simple cycles
from the SCC S. For a simple cycle C = (e1, . . . , en), let w(c) =
∑
e∈C w(e). For a multi-cycle
C, let w(C) =
∑
C∈C w(C) (note that in this summation, a cycle C may appear multiple times in
C). A non-negative multi-cycle is a non-empty multi-set of simple cycles C such that w(C) > 0
(i.e., in both the dimensions, the weight is non-negative). In [20], it has been shown that the
problem of deciding if S has a non-negative multi-cycle can be solved in polynomial time by solving
a set of linear inequations. In our case, we are interested in multi-cycles such that w0(C) 6 c and
w1(C) > d− ǫ. As in the proof of Lemma 10 in [20], this can be checked by defining the following
set of linear constraints. Let VS and ES respectively denote the set of vertices and the set of edges
in S. For every edge e ∈ ES , we consider a variable χe.
(a) For v ∈ VS, let In(v) and Out(v) respectively denote the set of incoming edges to v and the
set of outgoing edges from v. For every v ∈ VS , we define the linear constraint
∑
e∈In(v) χe =∑
e∈Out(v) χe which intuitively models flow constraints.
(b) For every e ∈ ES , we define the constraint χe > 0.
(c) We also add the constraint
∑
e∈ES
χe · w0(e) 6 c and
∑
e∈ES
χe · w1(e) > d− ǫ.
(d) Finally, we define the constraint
∑
e∈ES
χe > 1 that ensures that the multi-cycle is non-empty.
This set of linear constraints can be solved in polynomial time, and formally following the arguments
from [15], it has a solution if and only if there exists a multi-cycle C such that w0(C) 6 c and
w1(C) > d − ǫ. The NP-membership follows since we have linearly many maximal SCCs from
each vertex v′ in the bi-weighted graph that is obtained from G by fixing the choices of Player 0
according to the memoryless strategy σv
′
0 , and there are linearly many vertices v
′ for which we need
to check that v′ is not (c, d)ǫ-bad.
Now we show that the memory required by the strategy σFM0 as described above is pseudopoly-
nomial in the input size. Recall from the proof of Theorem 4.4 that k and τ are polynomial in
the size of G, and the largest weight W appearing on the edges of G. Assuming that the weights
are given in binary, the number of states in the finite state machine realizing this strategy is thus
poly(|G|,W ), and hence pseudopolynomial in the input size, assuming that the weights are given
in binary.
In [9], it has been shown that given a mean-payoff game G, a vertex v in G, and a rational
c, one can decide in non-deterministic polynomial time if ASV(v) > c. The use of an infinite
memory strategy σ0 for Player 0 such that ASV(σ0)(v) > c has been shown in [9]. Here we give an
improvement to that result in [9] showing that if there exists a strategy σ0 for Player 0 such that
ASV(σ0)(v) > c, then there exists a finite memory strategy σ
FM
0 such that ASV(σ
FM
0 )(v) > c.
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Towards this, we first define the notion of a witness for ASV as it appears in [9].
Witnesses for ASV For a mean-payoff game G, we associate with each vertex v in G, the following
set of pairs of real numbers:
Λ(v) = {(c, d) ∈ R2 | v ≪ 1≫MP0 6 c ∧MP1 > d}
A vertex v is said to be (c, d)-bad if (c, d) ∈ Λ(v). Let c′ ∈ R. A play π in G is called a (c′, d)-witness
of ASV(v) > c if (MP0(π),MP1(π)) = (c
′, d) where c′ > c, and π does not contain any (c, d)-bad
vertex. A play π is called a witness of ASVǫ(v) > c if it is a (c′, d)-witness of ASV(v) > c for
some c′, d.
Now we state the following theorem which is similar to Theorem 4.4, but in the context of
ASV instead of ASVǫ.
Theorem 4.10. For all mean-payoff games G, for all vertices v in G, and for all rationals c, we
have that ASV(v) > c if and only if there exists a regular (c′, d)-witness of ASV(v) > c.
The proof of this theorem is exactly the same as that of Theorem 4.4, and hence omitted.
Now using Lemma 8 in [9] (which is similar to Lemma 4.3, but in the context of ASV instead
of ASVǫ), and using Theorem 4.10, we obtain the following theorem.
Theorem 4.11. For all mean-payoff games G, for all vertices v ∈ V , and for all rationals c, if
ASV(v) > c, then there exists a pseudopolynomial memory strategy σ0 for Player 0 such that
ASV(σ0)(v) > c.
The proof follows since as in the proof of Theorem 4.4, the values of k and τ are polynomial
in the size of G, and the weights on the edges which are assumed to be given in binary.
It has been shown in [9] that given a mean-payoff game G, a vertex v, and a rational c ∈ Q,
checking ifASV(v) > c is in NP. The use of 6 for establishing the existence of memoryless strategies
for Player 0 for MP0 > c∨MP1 6 d− ǫ in the case of ASV
ǫ instead of < in MP0 > c∨MP1 < d
in the case of ASV makes the proof for ASVǫ more involved.
Now we establish that in a mean-payoff game G, the ASVǫ and the ASV from every vertex v
in the game G do not change even if Player 0 is restricted to using only finite memory strategies.
Formally, we state this below.
Corollary 4.12. For all mean-payoff games G, for all vertices v in G, for all ǫ > 0, and for all
rationals c, if ASVǫ(v) = c (ASV(v) = c), then for every c′ < c, there exists a finite memory
strategy σFM0 for Player 0 such that ASV
ǫ(σFM0 )(v) > c
′ (ASV(σFM0 )(v) > c
′). This implies that
sup
σ0∈ΣFM0
ASVǫ(σ0)(v) = ASV
ǫ(v) = c ( sup
σ0∈ΣFM0
ASV(σ0)(v) = ASV(v) = c), that is, ASV
ǫ
FM(v) =
ASVǫ(v) (ASVFM(v) = ASV(v)).
We conclude this section by showing that the threshold problem is at least as hard as the
value problem in the zero-sum mean-payoff game which is known to be in NP ∩ coNP, and whose
precise complexity is not known [22]. The zero-sum mean-payoff game is played between two
players, Player 0 and Player 1, for an infinite duration and on a finite (single) weighted arena
A = (V,E, 〈V0, V1〉, w), where V is a set of vertices partitioned into V0 and V1 belonging to Player 0
and Player 1 respectively, E is a set of edges, and w : E → Q assigns a rational weight to the edges
of A. We denote the zero-sum mean-payoff game by G0 = (A,MP). Initially, a token is put on
some vertex of G0. At each step of the play, the player controlling the vertex where the token is
present chooses an outgoing edge and moves the token along the edge to the next vertex. Players
interact in this way an infinite number of times and a play π of the game is simply an infinite
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path traversed by the token. At each step, the objective of Player 0 is to choose an outgoing
edges from the vertices she owns in a way so as to maximise the lim inf of the mean of the play
π, denoted MP(π), while the objective of Player 1 is the opposite. Given a rational c, the value
problem in the zero-sum mean-payoff game is to decide whether Player 0 has a strategy to get a
mean-payoff greater than c against all possible strategies of Player 1. Zero-sum mean-payoff games
are determined, and optimal memoryless strategies are known to exist for both players.
We now provide the following hardness result.
Theorem 4.13. For all mean-payoff games G, for all vertices v in G, for all ǫ > 0, and for all
rationals c, the problem of deciding if ASVǫ(v) > c or ASV(v) > c is at least as hard as solving
the value problem in zero-sum mean-payoff games.
Proof. We show the proof for ASVǫ(v) > c. The proof for the case of ASV(v) > c is exactly
the same. Consider a zero-sum mean-payoff game G0 = (A,MP), where A = (V,E, 〈V0, V1〉, w).
We construct a bi-weighted mean-payoff game G = (A′,MP0,MP1) from G0 simply by adding to
the arena A a weight function w1 that assigns a weight 0 to each edge. Stated formally, A
′ =
(V,E, 〈V0, V1〉, w,w1) such that for all e ∈ E, we have that w1(e) = 0.
Now consider that from a vertex v ∈ V , Player 0 has a winning strategy σ0 in G0 such that
MP(σ0, σ1) > c for all Player 1 strategies σ1, and where c is a rational. We show that by playing
σ0 from v in G, we have that ASV
ǫ(v) > c. For every play π ∈ Outv(σ0) in G, we have that
MP1(π) = 0, and Player 1 has a response σπ such that Outv(σ0, σπ) = π. In G, Player 1 thus
chooses a strategy that minimizes the mean-payoff of Player 0, and since in G0, we have that
MP(σ0, σ1) > c for all strategies σ1 of Player 1, it follows that ASV
ǫ(v) > c.
Now in the other direction, consider that in G, we have ASVǫ(v) > c. Thus from Lemma 4.1,
there exists a strategy σ0 for Player 0 such that ASV
ǫ(v)(σ0) > c. Using similar arguments as
above, we see that σ0 is also a winning strategy in G0 giving a mean-payoff greater than c to
Player 0.
5 Computation of the ASVǫ
Given a two-dimensional mean-payoff game G, a vertex v in G, in this section, we show how to
compute ASVǫ(v). We first show a method to compute ASVǫ(v) using the theory of reals with
additions. This approach is very similar to the one followed in [9] with the difference that we use
the formula Ψǫv over first order theory of reals with addition instead of Ψv as has been described
below. We describe this approach for completeness, and also because it gives us the necessary
intuition to compute ASVǫ(v), using a second method, by solving a set of linear programs (LP)
leading to establishing an EXPTime algorithm. This second method is new to this work, and does
not appear in [9]. Moreover, [9] does not provide any complexity for the computation of ASV.
One can show that, with small modifications to our method involving solving linear programs, it
is possible to compute ASV(v) as well in EXPTime.
In the previous section, we established the existence of a notion of witness for ASVǫ(v) > c,
for a rational c, leading to an NP algorithm for the threshold problem. We now show how to use
this notion to effectively compute the ASVǫ(v). To do this, we refer to the following lemma which
has been established in [9].
Lemma 5.1. [Lemma 9 in [9]] For all mean-payoff games G, for all vertices v in G, and for all
rationals c, d, we can effectively construct a formula Ψv(x, y) of 〈R,+, <〉 with two free variables
such that (c, d) ∈ Λ(v) if and only if the formula Ψv(x, y)[x/c, y/d] is true.
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Using the above lemma we can now compute an effective representation of the infinite set of
pairs Λǫ(v) for each vertex v of the mean-payoff game. This is stated in the following lemma.
Lemma 5.2. For all mean-payoff games G, for all vertices v in G, for all ǫ > 0, and for all rationals
c, d, we can effectively construct a formula Ψǫv(x, y) of 〈R,+, <〉 with two free variables such that
(c, d) ∈ Λǫ(v) if and only if the formula Ψǫv(x, y)[x/c, y/d] is true.
Proof. From the definition of Λ(v) from [9], we know that a pair of real values (c, d) ∈ Λ(v) if
v ≪ 1 ≫MP0 6 c ∧MP1 > d. We now recall from the definition of Λ
ǫ(v) that (c, d) ∈ Λǫ(v) if
v ≪ 1≫MP0 6 c∧MP1 > d− ǫ. From this, we can see that Ψ
ǫ
v(x, y) ≡ ∃e > 0 ·Ψv(x, y− ǫ+ e)
Extended mean-payoff game Similar to the approach of [9], we modify the area A in the
given mean-payoff game G = (A, 〈MP0,MP1〉) with A = (V,E, 〈V0, V1〉, w0, w1), and construct an
extended mean-payoff game Gext = (Aext, 〈MP0,MP1〉), where the new arena A
ext is defined as
Aext = (V ext, Eext, 〈V ext0 , V
ext
1 〉, w
ext
0 , w
ext
1 ), and whose vertices and edges are defined as follows. The
set of vertices is V ext = V × 2V . With a history h in G, we associate a vertex in Gext which is a
pair (v, P ), where v = last(h) and P is the set of the vertices traversed along h. Accordingly the
set of edges and the weight functions are respectively defined as Eext = {((v, P ), (v′ , P ′)) | (v, v′) ∈
E and P ′ = P ∪ {v′}} and wexti ((v, P ), (v
′, P ′)) = wi(v, v
′), for i ∈ {0, 1}. We can see that there
exists a bijection between the plays π in G and the plays πext in Gext which start in vertices of
the form (v, {v}), i.e. πext is mapped to the play π in G that is obtained by removing the second
dimension of its vertices.
We write the following proposition which is the same as Proposition 10 in [9] with the differ-
ence that we use here ASVǫ instead of ASV.
Proposition 5.3. For all mean-payoff games G, the following holds:
• Let πext be an infinite play in the extended mean-payoff game and π be its projection on the
original mean-payoff game G (over the first component of each vertex); the following properties
hold:
– For all i < j, if πext(i) = (vi, Pi) and π
ext(j) = (vj , Pj), then Pi ⊆ Pj
– MPi(π
ext) =MPi(π), for i ∈ {0, 1}.
• The unfolding of G from v and the unfolding of Gext from (v, {v}) are isomorphic and so
ASVǫ(v) = ASVǫ(v, {v})
By the first point of the above proposition and since the set of vertices of the mean-payoff
game is finite, the second component of any play πext, that keeps track of the set of vertices visited
along πext, stabilises into a set of vertices of G which we denote by V ∗(πext). We now show how to
characterize ASVǫ(v) with the notion of witness introduced above and the decomposition of Gext
into SCC. This is formalized in the following lemma which is similar to Lemma 11 in [9] where it
characterizes ASV instead of ASVǫ.
Lemma 5.4. For all mean-payoff games G and for all vertices v in G, let SCCext(v) be the set of
strongly-connected components in Gext which are reachable from (v, {v}). Then we have
ASVǫ(v) = max
S∈SCCext(v)
sup{c ∈ R | ∃πext : πext is a witness for ASVǫ(v, {v}) > c and V ∗(πext) = S}
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Proof. First, we note the following sequence of inequalities:
ASVǫ(v) = sup{c ∈ R | ASVǫ(v) > c}
= sup{c ∈ R | ASVǫ(v) > c}
= sup{c ∈ R | ∃π : π is a witness for ASVǫ(v) > c}
= sup{c ∈ R | ∃πext : πext is a witness for ASVǫ(v, {v}) > c}
= max
S∈SCCext(v)
sup{c ∈ R | ∃πext : πext is a witness for ASVǫ(v, {v}) > c and V ∗(πext) = S}
The first two equalities follow from the definition of the supremum and that ASVǫ ∈ R. The
third equality follows from Theorem 4.2 that guarantees the existence of witnesses for strict
inequalities. The fourth equality is due to the second point in Proposition 5.3. The last equality
is a consequence of first point in Proposition 5.3.
By definition of Gext, for every SCC S of Gext, there exists a set of vertices of G which we denote
by V ∗(S) such that every vertex of S is of the form (v′, V ∗(S)), where v′ is a vertex in G. Now
for the SCC S, we define ΛextS =
⋃
v∈V ∗(S) Λ
ǫ(v) as the set of (c, d) such that Player 1 can ensure
v ≪ 1≫MP0 6 c ∧MP1 > d− ǫ from some vertex v ∈ S. Applying Lemma 5.2, we can now
construct a formula ΨǫS(x, y) which symbolically encodes the set Λ
ext
S .
Now, we can prove that ASVǫ(v) is effectively computable.
Theorem 5.5. For all mean-payoff games G, for all vertices v in G and for all ǫ > 0, the value
ASVǫ(v) can be effectively expressed by a formula in 〈R,+, <〉 and can be computed from this
formula.
Proof. To prove this theorem, we build a formula in 〈R,+, <〉 that is true iff ASVǫ(v) = z. Recall
from Lemma 5.4 that
ASVǫ(v) = max
S∈SCCext(v)
sup{c ∈ R | ∃πext : πext is a witness for ASVǫ(v, {v}) > c and V ∗(πext) = S}
Since it is easy to express max
S∈SCCext(v)
in 〈R,+, <〉, we concentrate on one SCC S reachable from
(v, {v}), and we show how to express
sup{c ∈ R | ∃πext : πext is a witness for ASVǫ(v, {v}) > c and V ∗(πext) = S}
in 〈R,+, <〉.
Such a value of c can be encoded by the following formula
ρSv (c) ≡ ∃x, y · x > c ∧ ΦS(x, y) ∧ ¬Ψ
ǫ
S(c, y)
where ΦS(x, y) is the symbolic encoding of Fmin(CH(C(S))) in 〈R,+, <〉 as defined in Lemma 2.1.
This states that the pair of values (x, y) are the mean-payoff values realisable by some play in
S. By Lemma 5.2, the formula ¬ΨǫS(c, y) expresses that the play does not cross a (c, y)
ǫ-bad
vertex. So the conjunction ∃x, y ·x > c∧ΦS(x, y)∧¬Ψ
ǫ
S(c, y) establishes the existence of a witness
with mean-payoff values (x, y) for the threshold c, and hence satisfying this formula implies that
ASVǫ(v) > c. Now we consider the formula
ρSmax,v(z) ≡ ∀e > 0 · ρ
S
v (z − e) ∧ ∀c · ρ
S
v (c) =⇒ c < z
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Figure 7: Example to calculate ASVǫ(v)
which is satisfied by a value that is the supremum over the set of values c such that c satisfies the
formula ρSv , and hence the formula ρ
S
max,v(z) expresses
sup{c ∈ R | ∃πext : πext is a witness for ASVǫ(v, {v}) > c and V ∗(πext) = S}
From the formula ρSmax,v, we can compute the ASV
ǫ(v) by quantifier elimination in
max
S∈SCCext(v)
∃z · ρSmax,v(z)
and obtain the unique value of z that makes this formula true, and equals ASVǫ(v).
Example 5.6. We illustrate the computation ofASVǫ with an example. Consider the mean-payoff
game G depicted in Figure 7. We note that in the mean-payoff game there exists exactly one SCC
which is S = {v1}, and it contains exactly one cycle v1 → v1. Thus, Fmin(CH(C(S))) = {(3, 5)}.
Thus, we get that ΦS(x, y) ≡ x = 3 ∧ y = 5. Now Λ
ǫ(v) = {(c, d) | c > 3 ∧ d < 5 + ǫ}, and hence
ΨǫS(x, y) ≡ x > 3 ∧ y < 5 + ǫ. We note that the formula ρ
S
v0
(c) holds for values of c less than
3, and by assigning 3 to x, and 5 to y, and thus ρSmax,v0(z) holds true for z = 3. It follows that
ASVǫ(v0) = 3 since we have a single SCC in the example.
5.1 An EXPTime algorithm for computing ASVǫ(v)
Now we provide another approach for computing ASVǫ(v). We use linear programming to solve
the problem and obtain an EXPTime upper bound for the computation of ASVǫ(v). Note that
no complexity upper bound for computation of ASV was reported in [9]. As described earlier,
we first create the extended game Gext, followed by expressing the formula ρSmax,v0 , for each SCC
S ∈ SCCext(v), as a set of linear programs such that the maximum value over the set of solutions over
all SCCs corresponds to ASVǫ(v). We first illustrate our approach with the help of the following
example.
Example 5.7. Consider again the mean-payoff game G in Example 5.6. We previously showed
that the ASVǫ(v0) can be computed by quantifier elimination of a formula in the theory of reals
with addition. Now, we compute ASVǫ(v0) by constructing G
ext, and then by solving a set of linear
programs for every SCC in Gext. In this example, there exists only one SCC S = {(v1, {v0, v1})}
in Gext. From Lemma 2.1, we have that Fmin(CH(C(S))) can be defined using a set of linear
inequations. Now recall from Example 5.6 that Fmin(CH(C(S))) = {(3, 5)}, and Λǫ = {(c, y) | c >
3 ∧ y < 5 + ǫ}. Thus the complement of Λǫ(v0), that is, Λ
ǫ
(v0) = R × R − Λǫ(v0) = {(c, y) | c <
3 ∨ y > 5 + ǫ}. Also ΦS(x, y) is satisfied by x = 3 ∧ y = 5. Now we express the formula ρ
S
v0
(c)
as ∃x, y  x > c ∧ x = 3 ∧ y = 5 ∧ (c < 3 ∨ y > 5 + ǫ). We maximise the value of c, which gives
us the following two linear programs: maximise c in ∃x, y  (x > c ∧ x = 3 ∧ y = 5 ∧ c < 3) and
maximise c in ∃x, y  (x > c ∧ x = 3 ∧ y = 5 ∧ y > (5 + ǫ)) which yields the set of solutions: {3}.
Thus, we conclude that ASVǫ(v0) = 3. Note that in an LP, the strict inequalities are replaced
with non-strict inequalities, and computing the supremum in the objective function is replaced by
maximizing the objective function.
22
Now we state the main result of this section.
Theorem 5.8. For all mean-payoff games G, for all vertices v in G and for all ǫ > 0, the ASVǫ(v)
can be computed in EXPTime.
Proof. The algorithm to compute ASVǫ(v) is defined as follows:
1. First we note that using Lemma 2.1, for each SCC S in Gext, the set Fmin(CH(C(S))) can
be expressed as a set of exponentially many inequations.
2. Recall that for every SCC S of Gext, there exists a set of vertices of G which we denote by
V ∗(S) such that every vertex of S is of the form (v, V ∗(S)). Now note that the formula
ΨǫS corresponds to
⋃
v∈V ∗(S)
Λǫ(v), and hence ¬ΨǫS in the formula ρ
S
v (c) corresponds to the set
⋂
v∈V ∗(S)
Λ
ǫ
(v). We show below that this set can be expressed as a union of exponentially many
systems of strict and non-strict inequations.
From Lemma 4 of [2], we have that Λǫ(v) can be represented as a finite union of polyhedra.
Considering a d-dimensional space, the set of points that satisfy the same set of linear inequa-
tions forms an equivalence class, also called cells [2]. Let VG denote the set of mean-payoff
coordinates of simple cycles in G, and we have that |VG | = O(W · |V |)
poly(d). Let B(VG)
denote the set of geometric centres where each geometric centre is a centre of at most d + 1
points from VG . Thus |B(VG)| = O(|VG |
d+1). From Lemma 6 of [2] that uses Carathe´odory
baricenter theorem in turn, we have that Λǫ(v) can be represented as a union of all cells
that contain a point from B(VG) which is in Λ
ǫ(v). Each cell is a polyhedron that can be
represented by O(VG) extremal points, or equivalently, by Theorem 3 of [2], by O(VG) · 2
d
inequations.
It follows that Λ
ǫ
(v) can also be represented as a union of O(|VG |
d+1) polyhedra. Hence⋂
v∈V ∗(S)
Λ
ǫ
(v) can also be represented as a union of O(|VG |
d+1) polyhedra. Thus we have
exponentially many linear programs corresponding to
⋂
v∈V ∗(S)
Λ
ǫ
(v), since the weights on the
edges are given in binary. In our case, we have d = 2.
Further, from Lemma 2.1, for bi-weighted arena, we have that Fmin(CH(C(S))) can be
represented by O(|VG |
2) linear inequations, and hence Fmin(CH(C(S))) ∩
⋂
v∈V ∗(S)
Λ
ǫ
(v) can be
represented by exponentially many linear programs. Further, these LPs can be constructed
in exponential time.
3. For each SCC S in the mean-payoff game Gext, we see that the value satisfying the formula
ρSmax,v can be expressed as a set of linear programs in the following manner:
• For each linear program, we have two variables x and y that represent the mean-payoff
values of Player 0 and Player 1 respectively, corresponding to plays in Fmin(CH(C(S)))
and a third variable c represents the c in the formula ρSv (c).
• The formula ρSv (c) can be expressed by a disjunction of a set of linear inequations, i.e.,∨
i Csti where each Csti is a conjunction of linear inequations. The disjunctions arise due
to the representation of
⋂
v∈V ∗(S)
Λ
ǫ
(v) as stated above. We use the variables (c, d) in the
linear inequations which represent the set
⋂
v∈V ∗(S)
Λ
ǫ
(v), and the variables (x, y) in the
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linear inequations representing the set Fmin(CH(C(S))). We also include the inequation
x > c. Further, to express the formula ρSv (c), the variable d should assume the value of
y that corresponds to the mean-payoff of Player 1 as stated earlier. Note that, we would
need to represent the difference between Fmin(CH(C(S))) that uses variables c, y and⋂
v∈V ∗(S)
Λǫ(v) that uses variables x, y. In the LP formulation, each strict inequation is
replaced by a non-strict inequation, and supremum in the objective function is replaced
with maximizing the objective.
• The set of linear programs we solve is maximise c under the linear constraints ∃x, y ·
(c, x, y)  Csti for each Csti ∈
∨
i Csti. The value satisfying the formula ρ
S
max,v is the
maximum over the set of solutions of the linear programs obtained.
We solve the above sets of linear programs for each SCC S present in the mean-payoff game G
to get a set of values satisfying the formula ρSmax,v. We choose the maximum of this set of values
which is the ASVǫ(v). Note that there can be exponentially many SCCs. Thus our algorithm runs
in EXPTime.
6 Achievability of the ASVǫ
Here we show that ASVǫ is achievable which is in contrast to [9] where the follower is fully rational.
Theorem 6.1. For all mean-payoff games G, for all vertices v in G, and for all ǫ > 0, we have
that the ASVǫ(v) is achievable.
The rest of this section is devoted to proving Theorem 6.1. We start by defining the notion
of a witness for ASVǫ(σ0).
Witness for ASVǫ(σ0) Given a mean-payoff game G, a vertex v in G, and an ǫ > 0, we say
that a play π is a witness for ASVǫ(σ0)(v) > c for a strategy σ0 of Player 0 if π ∈ Outv(σ0), and
π is a witness for ASVǫ(v) > c when Player 0 uses strategy strategy σ0 that is defined as follows.
• σ0 follows π if Player 1 does not deviate from π.
• If Player 1 deviates π, then for each vertex v ∈ π, we have that σ0 consists of a memoryless
strategy that establishes v 2≪ 1 ≫ MP0 6 c ∧MP1 > d − ǫ, where d = MP1(π). The
existence of such a memoryless strategy for Player 0 has been established in Section 4.
From Corollary 4.12, we know that ASVǫ(v) = ASVǫFM(v), i.e., the Adversarial Stackelberg
Value for fixed ǫ from vertex v of a game G remains the same even if we restrict Player 0 to using
only finite memory strategies. Note that however it is possible that the ASVǫ(v) is not achievable
by a finite memory strategy of Player 0 as shown in Theorem 3.1.
We consider below the interesting case, where ASVǫ(v) cannot be achieved by a finite memory
strategy. We show that for such cases, it can indeed be achieved by an infinite memory strategy.
Let ASVǫ(v) = c. For every c′ < c, from Theorem 4.5, there exists a finite memory strategy
σ0 such that ASV
ǫ(σ0)(v) > c
′. Now, consider a sequence of increasing real numbers c1 < c2 <
c3 < . . . < c for which there exist finite memory strategies σ
1
0, σ
2
0 , σ
3
0 , . . . such that for each ci, we
have that ASVǫ(σi0)(v) > ci.
We note from Theorem 4.4 that there exists a regular witness πi for ASVǫ(σi0)(v) > ci for
each σi0 where π
i = π1i(l
α·ki
1i · π2i · l
β·ki
2i · π3i)
ω.
We now describe a sequence of plays which serve as witnesses for the sequence of finite memory
strategies mentioned above. We show that these plays in the sequence differ from each other only
in the value of ki they use. This is stated in the following proposition.
24
Proposition 6.2. There exists a sequence of increasing real numbers, c1 < c2 < c3 < . . . < c, and
finite memory strategies σ10 , σ
2
0 , σ
3
0 , . . . of Player 0 such that for each ci, we have ASV
ǫ(σi0)(v) > ci,
and there exists a play πi that is a witness for ASVǫ(σi0)(v) > ci, where π
i = π1(l
α·ki
1 ·π2 ·l
β·ki
2 ·π3)
ω,
and π1, π2 and π3 are simple finite plays, and l1, l2 are simple cycles in the arena of the game G.
Proof. Consider the play πi = π1i(l
α·ki
1i · π2i · l
β·ki
2i · π3i)
ω which is a witness for ASVǫ(σi0)(v) > ci
for the strategy σi0. Let MP0(π
i) = c′i > ci.
We have thatMP0(π
i) increases proportionally with i as α ·ki and β ·ki increase with increasing
ki. This follows because we disregard the cases where ASV
ǫ(v) is achievable with some finite
memory strategy of Player 0, i.e., we only consider the case where ASVǫ(v) is not achievable by a
finite memory strategy of Player 0.
Note that there are finitely many possible simple plays and simple cycles. Thus w.l.o.g. we can
assume that in the sequence (πi)i∈N+ , the finite plays π1i, π2i, π3i, and the simple cycles l1i, l2i are
the same for different values of i. Thus,MP0(π1i(l
α·ki
1i ·π2i · l
β·ki
2i ·π3i)
ω) = c′i > ci,MP0(π1i(l
α·ki+1
1i ·
π2i · l
β·ki+1
2i · π3i)
ω) = c′i+1 > c
′
i,MP0(π1i(l
α·ki+2
1i · π2i · l
β·ki+2
2i · π3i)
ω) = c′i+2 > c
′
i+1, and so on, and
the only difference in the strategies σi0 as i changes is the value of ki, i.e, we increase the value of
α ·ki and β ·ki with increasing ki such that the effect of π2 and π3 on the mean-payoff is minimised.
Thus, at the limit, as i →∞, the sequence (ci)i∈N+ converges to α ·MP0(l1) + β ·MP0(l2) = c.
To show that lim
i→∞
ASVǫ(σi0)(v) = c, we construct a play π
∗ as follows. The play π∗ starts from
v, follows π1 until the mean-payoff of Player 0 over the prefix becomes greater than c1. Then for
i ∈ {2, 3, . . . }, starting from first(l1), it follows π
i, excluding the initial simple finite play π1, until
the mean-payoff of the prefix of πi becomes greater than ci. Then the play π
∗ follows the prefix of
the play πi+1, excluding the initial finite play π1, and so on.
Clearly, we can see that MP1(π
∗) = c. We let MP1(π
∗) = d = α ·MP1(l1) + β ·MP1(l2).
For the sequence of plays (πi)i∈N+ which are witnesses for (ASV
ǫ(σi0)(v) > ci)i∈N+ for the
strategies (σi0)i∈N+ , we let MP1(πi) = di. We state the following proposition.
Proposition 6.3. The sequence (di)i∈N+ is monotonic, and it converges to d in the limit.
Proof. Recall that MP0(π
i) increases monotonically with increasing i. Since the effect of the
finite simple plays π2 and π3 decreases with increasing α · ki and β · ki, the mean-payoff on the
second dimension also changes monotonically. If α ·MP1(l1) + β ·MP1(l2) >
w1(π2)+w1(π3)
|π2|+|π3|
, then
the sequence (di)i∈N+ is monotonically non-decreasing. Otherwise, the sequence is monotonically
decreasing.
The fact that this sequence converges to d in the limit can be seen from the construction of π∗
as described above.
Now, we have the tools to prove Theorem 6.1.
Proof of Theorem 6.1. We start by constructing a sequence of increasing numbers c1 < c2 < c3 <
. . . < c such that:
• For every i ∈ N+, we consider a strategy σi0 of Player 0 that ensures ASV
ǫ(σi0)(v) >
ci.[Follows from Theorem 4.5]
• The strategy σi0 follows a play π
i = π1(l
α·ki
1 · π2 · l
β·ki
2 · π3)
ω where π1, π2 and π3 are simple
finite plays and l1, l2 are simple cycles in the game G. [Follows from Proposition 6.2]
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• We let MP0(π
i) = di. The sequence (di)i∈N+ is monotonic.[Follows from Proposition 6.3]
• We construct a play π∗ from (πi)i∈N+ as described above such that MP0(π
∗) = c and
MP1(π
∗) = d.
If the ASVǫ is not achievable, then there exists a strategy of Player 1 to enforce some play π′
such that MP0(π
′) = c′ < c and MP1(π
′) = d′ > d − ǫ. Now, we use the monotonicity of the
sequence (di)i∈N+ to show a contradiction.
Since the sequence (di)i∈N+ is monotonic, there can be two cases.
1. The sequence (di)i∈N+ is monotonically non-decreasing.
2. The sequence (di)i∈N+ is monotonically decreasing.
We start with the first case where the sequence (di)i∈N+ is non-decreasing. Assume for contra-
diction that ASVǫ(v) is not achievable, i.e. Player 1 deviates from π∗ to enforce the play π′ such
that MP0(π
′) = c′ < c and MP1(π
′) = d′.
Since (di)i∈N+ is non-decreasing, and thus d > di for all i ∈ N
+, and since Player 1 can let his
payoff to be reduced by an amount that is less than ǫ in order to reduce the payoff of Player 0, for
all i ∈ N+ we have that d′ > di − ǫ. We know that the sequence (ci)i∈N+ is increasing. Thus, there
exists a j ∈ N such that c′ < cj . Note that if π′ = πr for some index r, we consider some j which
is also greater than r.
Now, consider the strategy σj0 of Player 0 which follows the play πj . We know thatMP0(πj) > cj
andMP1(πj) = dj . We also know from Lemma 4.3 that the play πj does not cross a (cj , dj)
ǫ-bad
vertex. Since by the construction of π∗, and by Proposition 6.2, the set of vertices appearing in
the play π∗ is the same as the set of vertices appearing in the play πj, for every vertex v in π
∗,
we have that Player 1 does not have a strategy such that v ≪ 1 ≫ MP0 6 cj ∧MP1 > dj − ǫ.
Since c′ < cj and d
′ > dj − ǫ, it also follows that Player 1 does not have a strategy such that
v ≪ 1 ≫MP0 6 c
′ ∧MP1 > d
′. Stated otherwise, from the determinacy of multi-player mean-
payoff games, we have that Player 0 has a strategy to ensure v 6≪ 1≫MP0 6 c
′ ∧MP1 > d
′ for
every vertex v appearing in π∗. In fact, Player 0 can ensure v 6≪ 1 ≫MP0 6 c
′ ∧MP1 > d
′ by
choosing the strategy σj′ for some j
′ ≥ j. Since ASVǫ(v) = sup
σ0∈Σ0
ASVǫ(σ0)(v), and the sequence
(ci)i∈N+ is increasing, and we have that ASV
ǫ(σi)(v) > ci for all i ∈ N+, it follows that the
existence of π′ is a contradiction.
Now, we consider the case where the sequence (di)i∈N+ is monotonically decreasing. Again,
assume for contradiction that ASVǫ(v) is not achievable, i.e., Player 1 deviates from σ∗0 to enforce
the play π′ such that MP0(π
′) = c′ < c and MP1(π
′) = d′. Since the sequence (di)i∈N+ is
monotonically decreasing, we know that there must exist a j ∈ N such that (i) d′ > dj − ǫ, and
∀i > j, we have that d′ > di− ǫ, and (ii) cj > c
′, which follows since (ci)i∈N+ is a strictly increasing
sequence. Thus for every vertex v in π∗, Player 1 does not have a strategy such that there exists a
play π in Outv(σ
j
0), and v ≪ 1≫MP0 6 cj ∧MP1 > dj − ǫ.
Finally, using the fact that c′ < cj and d
′ > dj − ǫ, the contradiction follows exactly as above
where the sequence (di)i∈N+ is monotonically non-decreasing.
7 Conclusion and Future Work
In this work, we considered two-player non-zero sum infinite duration mean-payoff Stackelberg
games played on graph arenas. We also assumed that the follower is bounded rational, and hence
would always choose an ǫ-best-response to the leader’s strategy.
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In [9], the authors assume that the follower is fully rational, and thus will always play an ad-
versarial best-response for a given strategy of the leader (when it exists). However, the assumption
that the follower is fully rational may not always be realistic.
We considered the threshold problem, i.e, checking ifASVǫ > c, and showed that the problem is
in NP, and it is at least as hard as the value problem in zero-sum mean-payoff games. Additionally,
we showed that if ASVǫ > c, we can construct a pseudopolynomial memory strategy for the leader
to achieve this threshold. We also showed that both ASVǫ and ASV remain unaffected when the
leader is allowed to use only finite memory strategies. We gave an EXPTime algorithm to compute
the ASVǫ, and showed that the ASVǫ is always achievable, possibly with an infinite memory
strategy, which is in contrast with the framework where the follower is fully rational [9].
Several problems related to the results presented here can be studied. We conjecture that the
threshold problem is at least as hard as deciding the existence of a winning strategy in zero-sum
mean-payoff games in a bi-weighted game graph [20] whose precise complexity is also an open
problem. We would like to study this relative hardness result. Another interesting direction is to
explore possible characterization of Stackelberg mean-payoff games where a finite memory strategy
of Player 0 suffices to achieve the ASVǫ. This will allow us to get an estimate of how “complex”
a game is in terms of the memory required by Player 0 in order to achieve the ASVǫ.
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A Missing details in the proof of Lemma 4.3
Below we compute the expressions for k and τ for case 1 in the proof of Theorem 4.4. We know
that for play π = π1ρ1ρ2ρ3 . . . , where ρi = l
[αi]
1 .π2.l
[βi]
2 .π3, constants α, β ∈ R are chosen such that:
α ·MP0(l1) + β ·MP0(l2) = c
′
α ·MP1(l1) + β ·MP1(l2) = d
α+ β = 1
We assume here that MP0(l1) >MP0(l2) and MP1(l1) <MP1(l2). This implies that one simple
cycle, l1, increases Player 0’s mean-payoff while the other simple cycle, l2, increases Player 1’s
mean-payoff. We build a play π′ = π1 · (l
[α]k
1 · π2 · l
[k+τ ]β
2 .π3)
ω where we choose constant k ∈ N and
constant τ > 0 such that MP0(π
′) = c′ and MP1(π
′) = d. We try to express the conditions for k
and τ below:
MP0(π
′) =
k · α · w0(l1) + (k + τ) · β · w0(l2) + w0(π2) + w0(π3)
k · α · |l1|+ (k + τ) · β · |l2|+ |π2|+ |π3|
=
k · (α · w0(l1) + β · w0(l2)) + τ · β · w0(l2) + w0(π2) + w0(π3)
k · (α · |l1|+ β · |l2|) + τ · β + |π2|+ |π3|
MP1(π
′) =
k · α · w1(l1) + (k + τ) · β · w1(l2) + w1(π2) + w1(π3)
k · α · |l1|+ (k + τ) · β · |l2|+ |π2|+ |π3|
=
k · (α · w1(l1) + β · w1(l2)) + τ · β · w1(l2) + w1(π2) + w1(π3)
k · (α · |l1|+ β · |l2|) + τ · β + |π2|+ |π3|
Let |π2| + |π3| = v, α · w0(l1) + β · w0(l2) = x0, α · w1(l1) + β · w1(l2) = x1, α · |l1| + β · |l2| = y,
w0(π2) + w0(π3) = z0 and w1(π2) + w1(π3) = z1. We simplify the inequalities above to get:
MP0(π
′) =
k · x0 + τ · β · w0(l2) + z0
k · y + τ · β + v
MP1(π
′) =
k · x1 + τ · β · w1(l2) + z1
k · y + τ · β + v
We know that MP0(π
′) = c′ and MP1(π
′) = d. Thus,
k · x0 + τ · β · w0(l2) + z0
k · y + τ · β + v
= c′
k · x1 + τ · β · w1(l2) + z1
k · y + τ · β + v
= d
k · x0 + τ · β · w0(l2) + z0 = c
′ · (k · y + τ · β + v)
k · x1 + τ · β · w1(l2) + z1 = d · (k · y + τ · β + v)
Simplifying the above inequalities we get:
k · (x0 − c
′ · y) = c′ · v + τ · β · (c′ − w0(l2))− z0
τ · β · (w1(l2)− d) = v · d+ k · (d · y − x1)− z1
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Finally, after substitution of τ in the first inequality expression and further simplification of both
expressions, we finally get:
k =
(c′ · v − z0)(w1(l2)− d) + (c
′ − w0(l2))(v · d− z1)
(x0 − c′ · y)(w1(l2)− d)− (d · y − x1)
τ =
v · d− z1
β · (w1(l2)− d)
+
d · y − x1
w1(l2)− d
·
k
β
The above two inequalities specify the range from which we can choose a suitable k and τ , such that
the requirements MP0(π
′) = c′ and MP1(π
′) = d are met. We note that k and τ are polynomial
in size of the game and the weights on the edges, i.e., O(k) = |W |2 · |V |3 and O(τ) = |W |3 · |V |5.
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